Abstract
Introduction
Money laundering and the predicate crimes of corruption and theft of public assets share three contemporary characteristics of dire consequences for capital-scarce developing nations: (1) the huge amounts of wealth involved in these illicit schemes amount to billions of dollars; 1 (2) the great mobility of capital nowadays that makes it difficult to identify and freeze or restrain stolen assets long enough to initiate the recovery process with a reasonable and fair chance of recovering them; 2 and (3) the many ways to hide or camouflage the assets or their transform, thus allowing criminals to (a) easily distance the proceeds of the crime from the crime; (b) separate the proceeds of the crime from its clean transform; and (c) allow the criminals to have easy access to the benefits of the crime in its clean transform. 3 The World Bank estimates that the cross-border flow of the global proceeds from criminal activities, corruption, and tax evasion is between $1 trillion and $1.6 trillion a year (World Bank and UNODC 2007, p. 1) . However, as Baker (2005) cautions, we must be mindful of the fact that there is no place in international financial statistics where you can find dirty money or laundered proceeds of flight capital, trade mispricing, or any account remotely suggesting such figures (p. 1 Ideally this would include estimates of the amount of money lost by developing countries from the theft of public assets by public officials; theft of public assets by private individuals such as tax evasion; various other types of evasion of public dues; conversion of public assets by private individuals; and estimates of the quantum of cross-border movement of illicit money for laundering purposes, taking care not to doublecount these "dirty" monies in summing across the different typologies of illicit financial flows. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale (1995) . 2 Mark Pieth, President of the Board of the Basel Institute on Governance (http://baselgovernance.org), argues that asset recovery is a promising strategy against graft, the embezzlement of public funds, and corruption, but that effective asset recovery requires asset tracing. This in turn requires the cooperation of banks, other non-bank financial intermediaries, and lawyers (collectively known as "gatekeepers"), as well as Financial Intelligence Units, law enforcement agencies, and forensic specialists. Pieth is at pains to note that it is so "fundamental to ensure that funds can be blocked on a provisional basis in just a few hours after detection" that any jurisdiction missing this requirement "has to be considered a safe haven for those committing graft" (Basel Institute on Governance, 2009, p. 7) . 3 For more on this, see Baker and Shorrock (2009). 162). 4 Nonetheless, even by conservative estimates of the scale of the phenomenon, there is little doubt about the potential and actual devastation that follows when capital of this magnitude continuously bleeds out of a capital-scarce developing region. The studies in Ajayi and Ndikumana (2014) seek to shed more light on this phenomenon, particularly in Africa, with a view to finding lasting solutions. As part of that contribution, this paper explores and elaborates the relationship between stolen asset recovery (StAR) and illicit financial flows. Additionally, we emphasize the potential benefit from pursing value recovery of stolen assets. Value recovery of stolen assets is a broader approach to combating illicit financial flows than the familiar and traditional stolen asset recovery initiative.
The connection between value recovery of stolen assets and illicit financial flows is twofold: one, the deterrence effect of a value recovery mechanism on potential transgressors; and two, the deterrence effect of the pursuit of consequential damage claims against all those involved in the criminal enterprise value chain. In order to better understand how the deterrence effect is presumed to operate, we should note that the ability of public officials to successfully steal public funds can tempt others into joining politics to pursue this tested means to instant and lasting wealth. The nature of the enforcement system in a country is an important determinant of the degree of likelihood of a successful grand theft scheme. 5 The bigger the expected gains and the more visible the demonstrated effects through a history of successful takings, the stronger would be this pull. A string of successes would include not only the extra-legal enrichment, but also the ability of the accused individuals to (1) effectively launder these illegally obtained resources; (2) 4 Many of the publications cited herein and in Ajayi and Ndikumana (2014) refer to various estimates of the magnitude of the pillage both regionally and internationally. Extant sources include Baker (2005) , Ndikumana (2001, 2003) , and Ndikumana and Boyce (2011) . 5 For more on the institutional underpinnings of corruption, see Ayogu and Gbadebo-Smith (2014) .
convert the looted resources into assets that are not easily traceable; and (3) have full access to the stolen assets in their new, clean, and not-easily traceable form. Therefore, if this type of (predicate) crime -grand theft -ceases to be profitable, then as a rational response by its perpetrators, its supply (production or manufacture) will surely decrease. So will that component of illicit financial flows induced by it. Similarly, all the likely externalities (consequential damages thereof) will be mitigated, and most importantly, the corrosive effects of such activities on governance would be minimized. This also implies two possible channels to mitigate consequential damages-one, the direct abatement of the externalities through a reduction of the effluents (i.e. increase in the number of persons abandoning this line of business), and two, the incentive effect according to which "polluters," in this case criminals, are forced to internalize the externalities (i.e. do the crime, pay the price).
Going forward, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the value recovery process, highlighting the distinction between value recovery and asset recovery, as well as the importance of prosecuting not just the primary offender but also those engaged in the entire criminal enterprise value chain. Thus, we highlight also the multifarious domestic and international challenges to implementing value recovery. In Section 3, we extend the country-level experiences to the global setting by focusing on the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the quintessential mechanism intended for the harmonization of asset recovery protocols worldwide. UNCAC's influence is briefly reviewed in order to gauge the global appetite for curbing illicit financial flows, notwithstanding the rhetoric around intentions and commitments. Section 4 concludes with some recommendations for advancing the agenda on curbing illicit financial flows. 
Overview of value recovery
Value recovery, as it relates to stolen public assets, is an important concept that is not widely known. By contrast, the recovery of stolen public assets is a much more widely known and understood concept since the coming into force of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005 and the launch of the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative in 2007. 6 As argued elsewhere (Davis and Giuliano, 2010) , value recovery is a much broader concept than stolen asset recovery. Value recovery recognizes that victims of grand corruption can recoup their losses through several channels that extend the course of action beyond those suggested by the narrower constructs of stolen asset recovery. In particular, State Parties can pursue recovery of their stolen assets by exercising several options, which include (1) identifying and tracing the proceeds of the particular stolen assets to where they are hidden; (2) instituting claims against various parties in the liability chain; and (3) all of the above.
To provide some context for stolen assets value recovery, the first global instrument to enshrine the practice in international law is the UNCAC. Adopted by the UN General Assembly 
Implementing value recovery of stolen assets
Underpinning the four stages of the traditional approach to recovering stolen public assets is the customary practice of governments requesting other governments' assistance in the recovery process. But Davis and Giuliano (2010) The need to educate appropriate stakeholders continues to be of paramount importance.
Most in the anti-corruption community continue to refer to this topic-as do treaties-as stolen "asset" recovery. This label of "asset" recovery is value-laden and leads to stultified thinking when it comes to recovery of stolen wealth. This topic should be defined as stolen "value" or stolen "wealth" recovery.
This is not an academic distinction. Many of the modern treaties and tomes on "asset" recovery assume that there is a traceable asset waiting idly to be identified through tracing principles, then frozen and repatriated. That is usually the exception, not the rule. Much of the "value" to be gained-in the form of damages-can be found in claims against those who have layered and laundered the stolen wealth in such a way that tracing is either impossible or a very difficult and time-consuming process. So one must not think of "asset" recovery but must instead visualize the process as "value" recovery (p. 65).
In conclusion, Davis and Giuliano (2010) recommend that governments enlist the services of civil litigation teams since the former are not set up to pursue such civil claims themselves. Civil litigation teams can then employ available legal devices, and working in conjunction with relevant government agencies such as the police, they can recover the maximum value of the public assets stolen. Observers of the anti-corruption crusade criticize this outcome by pointing to the insignificance of the amount in comparison to the annual profit of the group's U.S. operation (Miron, 2013; Lowe, 2013 Lowe (2013, p. 1) . 17 It is doubtful that drug dealers, when convicted, are fined ten percent of their annual profits and then sent home. For readers who may protest that grand corruption and drug dealing are incomparable, we argue that over time, the consequences of grand corruption on human life in many developing countries is equally, if not more, devastating. For more on the human costs of grand corruption, including the impact on the Millennium Development Goals, see World Bank (2007, p. 11) . 18 "Given the enormous sums of money apparently laundered by Riggs for the Obiang regime, some question" the adequacy of the civil settlement and criminal fine (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, p. 34) . 19 Note that in the case of James Ibori, there was no plea bargain or deferred prosecution once he admitted to his crime.
Institutions for value recovery of stolen assets
Continuing the preceding discussion, but now under the rubric of institutions, we elaborate on the ramifications of the HSBC dispensation. This is important, not only because it pertains to Article 26(4) of UNCAC (2003), but also in view of the questions around penalties imposed for corporate wrongdoings. The HSBC dispensation, like the monetary penalty in the case of Riggs Bank and Equatorial Guinea, raises the issue of whether or not "effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions including monetary sanctions" are being dispensed. 20 Furthermore, it appears that one of the more troubling issues in criminal law enforcement in a globalizing world dominated by giant multinationals is the highly asymmetric treatment of natural and juristic persons. This is a major issue in discussions about the prosecution of the pillage of natural resources and white-collar crimes in general. 21 With recent remarks by U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder, who openly acknowledged the "too big to prosecute" conundrum, the equality of justice before all persons, both natural and juristic, has become an issue of even greater significance. According to Elizabeth Warren, a member of the United States Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, "there are district attorneys and United States attorneys out there every day squeezing ordinary citizens on sometimes very thin grounds and taking them to trial in order to make an example, as they put it. I'm really concerned that 'too big to fail' has become 'too big for trial'" (Reilly, 2013, p. 1) .
Recently, the U. agreements are such a powerful tool is that, in many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the government, or an NPA for that matter, it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to cooperate with the government's investigation, pay a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to face prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement" (p. 1).
Citing the DOJ's reasons as bogus, some legal scholars have vehemently disagreed with their opinion that DPAs surmount the supposed inability to gain compliance programs for structural reforms through guilty pleas.
22
We would like to conclude our discussion of country-level cases of value recovery and enforcement of anti-corruption and money-laundering regimes by noting that our emphasis on institutions in the U.S. is because precedents in the latter are important for gauging global trends in combating illicit financial flows. Institutions in the U.S. are functional compared to those in many countries that would be the object of illicit financial flows either as source or destination.
Also, the U.S. is a bellwether onshore financial center and secrecy jurisdiction as epitomized by 22 For more on this and other related excuses for NPAs and DPAs, see Markoff (2012) and FCPA (2012b).
destinations such as Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. 23 Therefore, there is much to be learned from understanding the structure of incentives in the U.S. and the resulting response from domestic organizations. The evolution of asset recovery in the Unites States should condition expectations from developing countries on the extent of cooperation forthcoming internationally.
On this note, we next review the global institutional setting for asset recovery.
Global record of UNCAC institutionalization
Chasing dirty money across international borders necessarily involves multiple jurisdictions. cooperation) underpin Chapter V on the recovery of stolen assets, we examine the global trends in these two aspects of the value recovery process.
In this section, the term "institutionalization" narrowly refers to progress in meeting the two crucial policy obligations identified above. "Pursuant to article 63 of the Convention, the
Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption was
established to improve the capacity of and cooperation between States parties to achieve the objectives set forth in the Convention and to promote and review its implementation. Taking stock of the review process so far, Dell (2012, p. 1) rates the process as "progressing slowly but steadily," and in some countries it appears to be prompting some reforms. He further states that "[t]he bad news is that the process continues to fall short of its potential due to lack of transparency and inclusiveness" (Dell, 2012, p. 1) . The UNODC, acting as the Secretariat to the 24 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP.html (accessed January 20, 2014) . 25 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP.html (accessed January 20, 2014) . 26 As of April 2013, a total of 164 countries have ratified the convention. Germany, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have not ratified.
States Parties, advises that it is not at liberty to disclose information about when and how the reviews are conducted. But this lack of transparency and inclusiveness seems to be changing. For example, the government of Panama posted notice of an impending visit in November 2012 of the review team to the country and invited non-governmental organizations to comment and provide necessary input. The government of Zimbabwe invited Transparency International-Zimbabwe to meet the country review team and informed the public that the visit had occurred. 27 Besides the lack of inclusiveness by design, as only state parties to the convention can participate and make inputs, the process is opaque and information is delimited. The public is guaranteed access to a short summary of the full review report. Thus, the only available avenue for the public to access a full report is at the discretion of the government concerned or upon successful application for access to information, where obtainable. Furthermore, UNODC publications of cross-country thematic reports on findings of the country reviews are in aggregated form and so do not uniquely identify countries (Dell, 2012, p. 2) . With regard to the latest findings, the two main thematic reports for the November 2012 meeting in Vienna covered 24 countries that had been reviewed for compliance with UNCAC chapters III and IV. The reports found that overall "implementation was inadequate in the areas of misappropriation of public funds, bribery of foreign public officials . . . and that the highest number of technical assistance requests related to articles 32 and 37,"
respectively, on witness/victim protection and cooperation with law enforcement authorities (Dell, 2012, p. 2) . 27 According to Dell (2012) , a Transparency International publication in June 2012 reported on experiences from the review process in 51 first and second cycle countries. These refer to countries that have elected to participate in those rounds of review. Thus cycle 1 countries are the set of countries participating in the first cycle of review.
In March 2013, supplemental information to the 2012 thematic reports on the implementation of chapters III and IV was released (CAC, 2013) . Based on country reviews, as of March 4, 2013, the latest regional report draws on information included in the review reports of 34 States Parties whose country reports had been completed or were close to completion under the first and second years of cycle 1 of the Review Mechanism. 28 In the supplemental information, two topics were selected for further review: legal basis for international cooperation with regard to extradition and MLA, and the nomination and role of central authorities for MLA (CAC, 2013) . The regions covered were Africa (6), Latin America and the Caribbean (2), West European and Other States (7), Asia-Pacific (10) and Eastern European (9), where the numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of countries from a particular region. With regard to the requirement for a legal basis for international cooperation, the report found that 9 out of the 34 countries made extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty but that no regional trend is discernible regarding whether or not a treaty was required (CAC, 2013, p. 3) . 
And it can be done: StAR achievements
There have been some successes in stolen asset recovery, though fewer in value recovery. Until financial institutions, lawyers, accountants, trustees, and other corporate service officers who facilitate the crime and the laundering of its proceeds are also made to pay, we will not advance from asset recovery to value recovery, a very important requirement in clamping down on the scourge.
After 18 years of pioneering struggle to recover stolen national assets that finally concluded in . While more can be accomplished in the area of asset recovery, it is important to recognize the constraints imposed by the lack of political will on the part of many governments around the world (Ayogu, 2011; Stephenson et al., 2011; OSCE, 2012; Tax Justice Network, 2013 ). Ayogu and Gbadebo-Smith (2014) analyze the nexus of governance and illicit financial flows and suggest ways to effectively address the political constraints endemic to the problem.
Understanding UNCAC record
We recognize two dimensions to the challenge of moving the UNCAC forward. One lies in victimized countries (those whose assets have been plundered) and the other in destination countries (the recipients of the stolen resources). In victimized countries, governments are called upon to prosecute grand corruption and recover stolen public assets, which often are in the possession of politically exposed persons (PEP relationship framework (CAC, 2013, p. 3) . Furthermore, as we have shown throughout this paper, the position of developed countries is shaped by domestic and global political considerations.
Rudolph Strahm emphasizes the workings of these forces in the Swiss example above (Shaxson, 2011, pp. 61-2) , but other examples such as the City of London are also elaborated (pp. 244-78).
The February 2013 issue of The Economist (2013a, 2013b) features "offshore finance." The magazine's around-the-shores review of financial havens reveals an alignment of formidable forces on both sides of the battle line. It suggests that, whereas politics may not be captive to interest groups in all the countries reviewed, public policy everywhere is still "the outcome of the efforts of politicians to gain and retain political office within a structure of domestic political institutions, sometimes to the benefit of particular interests, and other times not" (Bates, 1994, p. 12 Economist, 2013a, p. 1) . Austria is home to UNODC, but of all OECD countries, Austria is still "the furthest from meeting the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)" with regard to due diligence in anti-money laundering (The Economist 2013a, p. 5). 31 We close by noting that the UNCAC implementation review mechanism is a process about transparency that ironically is in some ways as opaque as the regime that it seeks to reform. This, of course, is an issue that is occurring at the global level and reflects the underlying hypocrisy at country levels.
Countries condemn the ravages of illicit financial flows, but condone the institutions that engage in or contribute to this criminality.
Conclusions and recommendations
The efficacy of the UNCAC, particularly MLA requests pertaining to tracing and identifying stolen assets, demands international cooperation to the fullest extent feasible. 32 International cooperation of the kind envisaged is a global public good. Therefore, having a global appetite for combating illicit financial flows is equivalent to a general willingness to supply this public good in response to the requirements of UNCAC. Clearly, as this study has revealed, the supply of this global public good appears to be problematic. It is an issue because it entails dispersed expected benefits and concentrated immediate costs. When a policy has distributional consequences, selfinterested groups will be in conflict. This conflict can be a political constraint leading to delays or inaction in adopting policies that seem beneficial to society on balance.
Scholars of political economy, such as Robert Bates (1994) , have persuasively argued that economic policy reforms tend to correlate with discontinuous changes in the composition of governments, a result that would be expected were economic reforms to generate policies that favor some interest groups (and their political representatives) more than others. This suggests that overcoming the challenges to effective asset recovery may not happen within the same institutions, which sustain or help engender the menace. Reformers can seek to change the 32 Legal experts emphasize reciprocity as an important factor in the enforcement of prejudgment remedies. For instance, the refusal by a foreign court to recognize and enforce a domestic prejudgment order could lead the domestic court to equally refuse an order such as a pretrial injunction from the same foreign court. Pretrial remedies are very crucial in asset recovery because "often it will be impossible or nearly impossible for the victim to even begin a lawsuit . . . without the sort of information that can be gained through the use of prejudgment remedies" (Davis and Giuliano, 2010, p. 7) . Even in cases where the location of the asset has been ascertained, pretrial reliefs such as "injunctions or freeze orders are crucial in making it harder to relocate the asset pendente lite" (p. 7).
structure of those political institutions, which shape the selection of policies. An element of these institutions is "political will." The political will for a particular policy is essentially a politician's response to the preferences of his or her political principals. When particular preferences are selected, it is because they secure immediate positive economic rewards for influential political constituents. Coalitions for a particular purpose such as anti-money laundering can gain political influence by organizing themselves accordingly, an injunction that is easier said than done.
We have learned much about what needs to be done. Awareness is essential in gaining constituencies, and sustaining the growing coalitions domestically and internationally requires commitment and resources. Because AML and curbing illicit financial flows are global public goods, organizing and sustaining the momentum for change is more challenging than the contrary.
Organizing to maintain the status quo benefits specific interest groups who face limited free-rider problems. Therefore, for further investigation, we recommend research activities that seek to uncover innovative ways of overcoming collective action problems in specific circumstances.
Moreover, research is called upon to expose the nature, preferences, and impact of external agents that intrude on domestic politics in Africa. These external agents influence, in one way or another, the likelihood of forging stronger regional coalitions against illicit financial flows. In a recent resolution, a High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows in Africa has stated that it will work "to increase collaboration and cooperation amongst African countries, their Regional Economic Communities, and external partners to promote better global understanding of the scale of the problem for African economies as well as encourage the adoption of relevant national, regional, and global policies, including safeguards and agreements to redress the situation" (ECA, 2012, p.
1). Working with external partners is fruitful only when the preferences and interests that drive those external cooperation efforts are better understood. Under such circumstances, Africans are better able to engage more strategically and with a higher likelihood of securing more favorable outcomes.
There are several ways in which Africa and its global partners can forge a formidable assault on illicit financial flows. First, mutual cooperation and financial transparency are canonical features of a successful value recovery landscape. Second, witness/victim (whistleblower) protection is a highly valuable resource in the repertoire. Third, the asymmetric treatment of natural and juristic persons is a dangerous vice regardless of the spin; thus every effort should be made to redress it.
Fourth, more effort should be given to streamlining MLA procedures and promoting cooperation.
Fifth, insofar as widespread variation in legal procedures escalate the transaction costs of value recovery, mechanisms need to be put in place to address this impediment to combating illicit flows. Sixth, and finally, global developments reflect country-level dynamics; the sources of international cooperation lie in domestic politics and are shaped by the structure of political institutions and the preferences of the political elites. This appreciation underscores our earlier recommendation that the locus of action should be on local political participation, sensitization, organization, advocacy, and the search for innovative approaches to collective action problems in the public policy arena. 
